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Dr Patrick Tissington stresses
the need for effective command
and decision-making training for
fire service personnel
A CRITICAL PROBLEM facing UK fire brigades isthat, in the past, there has been almost no scientificevidence on which to assess command training in
general and decision-making training in particular.
Decision-making training currently takes place during
debriefs of real incidents or exercises but, with no real
research base, there is no consistent framework and this key
learning element is dependent on the attitude of the
individual officers at the debrief.  
With British society becoming more litigious, the fire service
needs to be prepared to defend individual operational decisions
even when analysed in minute detail after the event. Brigades
must be able to prove that their officers are suitably trained. In
addition, brigades have a duty of care to staff, part of which is
to make sure that officers make the correct decisions at
incidents so that staff are not unduly exposed to risk. 
There is therefore a compelling business case for command
training built on this idea of legal defensibility, which adds to
the moral imperative for brigades to equip officers with the
tools for the job. This has led to initiatives like the ‘Safe person
concept’ which, along with technological innovation, have led
to enormous improvements in safety on the fireground and
historically low levels of serious accidents at emergencies. In
short, being a firefighter today is not the dangerous profession
it once was. Any brigade being questioned on its safety record
would be able to show how staff are trained and protective
equipment provided, personnel trained in its use and currency
maintained through refresher training. However, there remains
one chink in the armour. 
How can principal officers be certain that officers in their
brigade are correctly trained in the command of incidents? Is
it possible, for example, to measure their training against a
body of research that has measured or modelled the tasks of
incident command? Is it possible to show the criteria against
which individuals are selected and trained in the skills needed
to command incidents both effectively and safely? 
There is a certain amount of literature available but this is
almost entirely based on individual or committee reflection
on what appeared to work. The Fire Service College junior
officer programmes, while of undoubted high quality, are
based on historical precedent and on particular parts of the
fire training facility. Debriefing tends to be based on concepts
like the seven command functions which may be valuable
learning tools but there does not seem to be empirical
foundation for their use. In fact, few mid-ranking officers can
even name what these functions are. The traditional reference
book for the firefighter has been the Manual of Firemanship,
which contains a wealth of information but almost nothing
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about the skill of commanding incidents. The recent addition
of the Training Manuals provided a vital framework for
thinking about risk assessment and incident command
systems and, while there is a valuable appendix describing
research into incident command, no research findings are
offered, and no training structure is outlined concerning how
decisions are made on the UK fireground nor how they
should be trained. This potentially leads to a nightmare
scenario where a Chief Fire Officer would be unable to show
the basis on which he or she could justify confidence in their
training in command decision making.
Central roles
The role of the incident commander is to make decisions, and
act on them to bring the incident to a safe conclusion. This
means that decision making is central to the role of incident
command and therefore there should be an audit trail showing
how UK fire services define decision making, how they assess
competence in it and how it is trained. However, decision
making does not feature as a distinct competence in the Role
Map – the set of definitions of the elements which make up all
jobs in the UK fire service – nor as a discrete element on any
progression courses historically run at the Fire Service College.
Neither do brigades do this themselves. 
That said, given that decision making is central to the
command task, it must be exercised while the officer is in
command. So, during an existing exercise – be it tabletop, hot
seat, computer simulated or whatever – the officer designated
as in charge will receive experiential learning in decision
making. Indeed, other officers involved in the exercise may
also receive some experience from observation. 
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Since decision making is not currently exercised on its own,
the number of decisions exercised is limited and, perhaps as
importantly, the training does not currently happen in a way
which would lead to the effective construction of expertise. 
This means that a scenario is foreseeable whereby a
questionable decision is made at an incident and when the
inevitable court case opens, a smart barrister will ask ‘how
did the brigade train its officers in decision making – where
is the decision-making course in its suite of training courses?’
Such a dedicated decision-making course arguably does not
exist at present.
Decision-making model
The existing research in fireground decision making led to the
formulation of a model of decision making, recognition
primed decision making (RPD)1. The theory of RPD has
been the central theory arising from research into the decision
making of fire commanders since the late 1980s. This section
summarises the important concepts of the model and
highlights those which required further testing. 
The core concept of RPD is that the fire commander makes
decisions on the fireground via a process of recognition of key
elements in the situation, which are linked to previously
encountered situations stored in memory. Therefore, the
essence of fireground decision making is a process of
recognising elements of an incident and linking these with
previously encountered incidents. There is a burgeoning body
of evidence to support this fundamental concept2,3,4. This
type of process is also generally accepted to be the basis for
decision making in a wide range of high pressure decision-
making domains, including offshore oil emergencies, naval
control rooms, operating theatres and many more. 
The RPD model proposes that in recognising a situation, the
decision maker generates four by-products of recognition: 
• expectancies (what might happen next)
• plausible goals (what might be achievable)
• relevant cues (what signs are used to monitor the situation) 
• typical actions (typical things to do in a given situation)
Essentially, RPD predicts that these are the things on the mind
of the decision maker as the decision is made. However, little
clear justification has been shown for this, which is perhaps
surprising since this phase is key to the utility of the model
because this should be the level at which training can be
applied. In other words, if we know what the expert decision
maker has in mind having successfully recognised a situation,
we can design decision-making training programmes
specifically with these features. This means that training would
go with the grain of expertise-building rather than being
incidental – or even against the grain as it is at present.
Implementing theory-based training
mechanisms
PUTTING INTO practice the decision-making model based on the four
underlying factors – crew safety; the extent to which casualties need
to be rescued; time pressure; and the degree to which the incident
is contained – involves:
Training at all levels to be founded on asking questions based
on the four factors
From the moment a firefighter starts to be taught about command,
the four factors should be questions they are able to answer during
an incident. So during an exercise, if possible, the ‘action’ might be
paused and the trainee asked what the crew safety issues are, what
is the status of casualty rescue, what is the level of time pressure
and what are the threats to the containment of the incident.
Training officers to actively consider the four factors during
incidents
This can be used as the basis for dealing with particularly unusual
incidents where no ready-made solution is forthcoming. Asking the
questions will assist the recognition process.
Using the factors as the basis for decision-making debriefs
The fire service has recognised that it needs to reflect on how
incidents were managed. A well operated debrief is a critical learning
tool. However, with no framework for analysing decision making, it
has been difficult to formulate learning strategies from the debrief.
The findings of the research can be used as part of the incident
debrief as a framework for reflecting on decisions taken and used as
a tool for individual or organisational learning.
Incorporate the four factors into programmes of decision-
making exercises
The four factors should form the basis for decision-making exercises.
This concept is currently being piloted on junior courses at the Fire
Service College using a large number of short, low fidelity decision
exercises combined with reflective learning techniques. Observation
and debrief are rooted in the four elements ❑
D   DECISIONS
FP_APRIL.COMMAND  22/3/04  4:50 PM  Page 43
44
FEJ & FP April 2004
FOCUS: DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT
Research by the author was carried out over a five-year period
with a large number of participants from brigades in the UK.
A variety of psychological research techniques were used to
discover whether this model was valid for the UK fire
commander in overall concept and whether the detailed
predictions made by RPD concerning the cognition of the
expert fire commander were valid. 
The research showed that the basic concept of the RPD
model was valid for the UK fire officer. However, trying to
find out exactly what is on the mind of a decision maker
when the decisions in question are as dynamic as they are on
the fireground proved illusive. When interviewed after an
incident, officers would frequently report that they were
unaware of having made decisions – they were automatic. 
After many fruitless attempts using conventional research
methods, the author developed a new method which
combined techniques from different areas of psychology. The
results were analysed by a complex statistical technique called
multi dimensional scaling which shows results as a graphical
plot5. The analysis of these plots revealed what is on the
mind of the decision maker. It found that there are four
underlying factors: crew safety; the extent to which casualties
need to be rescued; time pressure; and the degree to which
the incident is contained. These are not, of course, the four
things predicted by the model. So the research concluded
that there is now an empirically derived model of decision
making for the incident commander. It also shows the form
that an effective decision-making component of command
training would take (see box).
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Fire Safety Training … now available on DVD format
Managing Fire Safety at Work
An FPA video collection
Purchase the FPA’s four mainstream fire safety training titles on just one DVD!
Extinguishing Fires at Work
Shows true novices receiving practical training in the use of workplace firefighting equipment, in particular the
identification and choice of portable fire extinguishers. Running time: 19min.
The Role of the Fire Warden
One of the FPA’s most important fire safety training programmes, which covers: risk assessment; arson
alert; hazard spotting; escape routes; action in the event of fire; the fire drill; the roll call; fire wardens
at work.  Running time: 11min.
Action in the Event of Fire
This hard-hitting presentation shows what might happen if untrained staff are faced with an outbreak
of fire. It places great emphasis on the importance of knowing what actions to take and when to take
them. Running time: 12min.
Fire Risk Assessment at Work
Ideal viewing for people concerned with making a fire risk assessment, this programme reviews the five
essential actions: identify the risks by inspection; review the findings; eliminate hazards; minimise hazards 
which cannot be removed; manage the residual risk.  Running time: 15min.
Now available at £249.95 plus VAT (15% discount for FPA members)
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The implication of these findings is a new approach to training
in decision making which is to train decision making isolated
from the ‘noise’ of the full exercise, where concerns of
equipment, technical issues and leadership can get in the way
of the training of decision making. The end product is a sound
basis for training in decision making which can now be carried
out in isolation and at very little cost. It would enable brigades
in the future to have better prepared incident commanders and
be more able to defend the effectiveness of their training ❑
Dr Patrick Tissington works in the Work and
Organisational Psychology Group at Aston University
Business School, Birmingham
Further information is available from Patrick Tissington on 
e-mail: p.a.tissington@aston.ac.uk
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